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Declining fertility and increasing longevity have rendered public pension systems in many 
OECD countries unsustainable and have triggered substantial reforms of these systems. One 
of the officially declared reform objectives is to raise the average retirement age. Crucial 
parameters for this endeavor are first the legal retirement age and secondly the early 
retirement provisions inherent in the public pension system. In this paper we discuss several 
notions of "fairness" of early retirement provisions in pay-as-you-go financed public pension 
systems and we claim that the "right" notion of fairness depends upon the objectives pursued 
in the design of pension systems. We point out the problems attached to the extreme positions 
"efficiency" and "welfare maximization" and propose a more modest concept of equity called 
"distributive neutrality", which is based on the notion that the ratio between total benefits and 
total contributions to the pension system should not depend systematically on the individual’s 
ability. By applying this concept to the German retirement benefit formula and taking 
empirically estimated relationships between average annual income, life expectancy and 
retirement age into account, we show that at the present discount rate of 3.6 per cent per year 
there is systematic redistribution from low to high earners, which would be attenuated if the 
discount rate were raised. This seemingly paradoxical finding is due to the fact that in our 
data set, there is a negative relationship between earnings and retirement age. 
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Declining fertility and increasing longevity have rendered public pension sys-
tems in many OECD countries unsustainable and have triggered substantial
reforms of these systems. One of the oﬃcially declared reform objectives is
to raise the average retirement age. Crucial parameters for this endeavor are
ﬁrst the legal retirement age and secondly the early retirement provisions in-
herent in the public pension system. In a free society, nobody can be forced
to work. Therefore any public pension system must allow workers to retire
before reaching the legal retirement age, but the conditions, i.e.the formula
which ties the pension level to the age of retirement, are open to debate. In
Germany, e.g., early retirement for non-disabled workers is currently possible
up to ﬁve years before reaching the legal retirement age, and the beneﬁt level
is cut by 3.6 per cent per year of early retirement and similar discount rates
apply in other OECD countries as demonstrated in ﬁgure 1, taken from the
survey by Queisser and Whitehouse (2006). Critics of the present situation
argue that the downward adjustment of the pension for early retirees is too
small and thus encourages early retirement and increases the costs of social
security (see, e.g.Herbertson and Orszag [2001], Börsch-Supan [2000]).
Clearly, the "right" rate of adjustment of the pension with respect to
retirement age depends upon several factors,
1. the normative criterion underlying the concept of "right" adjustment
rates: is it "pure" eﬃciency or are equity concerns to be taken into
account?
2. potential heterogeneity among workers with respect to life expectancy,
3. informational constraints: can the government observe either the in-
dividual worker’s length of life or at least factors which are correlated
with life expectancy?
The purpose of this paper is twofold: In the ﬁrst part, we give a survey of
the possible optimality or "fairness" criteria: in Section 2, we shall focus on
two diﬀerent concepts of eﬃciency, and in Section 3 equity concerns will come
into play in the tradition of the optimal taxation literature. In the second
part (Section 4), we shall propose a new and more modest concept of fairness
of the adjustment formula based on the notion of distributive neutrality. Its
2implications will be demonstrated using recent empirical estimates of the
relationship between earnings and life expectancy in the German Old Age
Insurance system. Section 5 oﬀers some concluding remarks.
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Reduction in accrued benefits for a year of early retirement, per cent
Sweden
Source: Queisser and Whitehouse (2006), OP: occupational pension.
Figure 1: Discounts for early retirement in OECD countries
2 Homogeneous Workers: Concepts of Eﬃciency
There is widespread agreement that social insurance systems should be so
designed as to achieve a given distributive target with the least degree of
distortions to individual decisions on education, labor supply, savings, and
other behavior. As an example, the German Old Age Insurance system is
based on a tight tax-beneﬁt linkage called "Teilhabe-Äquivalenz" (fairness
within cohorts), a feature which is explicitly aimed at minimizing labor-
supply disincentives. Such eﬃciency criteria are particularly important in a
world of equals, in which distributional concerns play no role. However, we
shall show that in the design of social security systems there is more than
one possible eﬃciency rule.
32.1 No Distortion of Work Incentives
A straightforward target is the neutrality of the early retirement provision
with respect to the labor supply decision of the worker: the pension system
should not distort the choice of retirement age (Börsch-Supan [2000] and
[2004]). This implies that net social security wealth, i.e. the present value of
all future retirement beneﬁts minus contributions, is not changed when the
worker retires one period later (or earlier). This feature of a pension system is
also called "marginal fairness". The normative appeal of marginal fairness is
strongest in a world of equals because in this case equity concerns do not play
a role and thus the pure eﬃciency goal of an undistorted choice prevails as the
single objective. Moreover, marginal fairness has unambiguous implications
only when the length of remaining life is certain because only in this case
can the present value of extra retirement beneﬁts be calculated so that it
exactly matches the "pension costs" of retiring one year later.
In theory, the implications of marginal fairness are straightforward: The
costs of retiring one year later are composed of the contributions paid to the
pension system and the forgone beneﬁts during the extra work year. If the
length of the retirement period were known, the additional beneﬁts could
be calculated so that they exactly match this amount in present value. The
discount rate to be applied in this calculation should be the "market interest
rate", preferably the rate at which workers can shift their consumption pos-
sibilities over time. In the case of a worker who already disposes of savings
which he can adjust to the changing stream of pension beneﬁts (and contri-
butions), the interest rate on government bonds seems to be the appropriate
one. Matters become more complicated for a worker who has no savings
apart from his social security wealth and who does not want to change his
consumption pattern when he decides to work another year. This person will
want to shift consumption from the retirement period to the present period
by borrowing against his pension entitlements, which would require a much
higher interest rate such as the one banks charge for overdraft loans.
In the practice of the German pension system, matters are complicated
by the fact that retirement beneﬁts accrue in proportion to total earnings
during working life. As a consequence, the contributions paid in an extra
year of working life already translate into additional beneﬁts, where the "rate
of return" equals the implicit rate of return of the pay-as-you-go system,
viz. the growth rate of earnings, which is considerably smaller than the
4interest rate. To achieve marginal fairness of the total return on the sum
of contributions and forgone beneﬁts, therefore, the rate of return on the
forgone beneﬁts must be much higher than the interest rate.
2.2 Minimizing the Burden on Other Generations
Incentive compatibility may be a sensible target in a one-household economy
but it becomes questionable as soon as an inﬁnite sequence of overlapping
generations is considered. A much more convincing objective for this case is
the requirement that the behavior of the retiree does not place a burden on
others, in particular on later generations of tax-payers. With this considera-
tion Ohsmann, Stolz, and Thiede (2004) justify the claim that the discount
rate used for making present-value calculations should equal the rate of re-
turn of the PAYG system, viz.the growth rate of earnings, g. Their reasoning
says that, as any Euro paid in period t as a contribution to a PAYG-ﬁnanced
social security scheme yields (1 + g) Euros in additional retirement beneﬁts
in period t + 1 – holding everything else constant, the same should be true
of an additional Euro paid or forgone due to postponing retirement by one
period. Furthermore, they argue that the adjustment rate currently in place
in Germany of 3.6 per cent per year comes close to this ﬁgure.
To assess the validity of this claim, we must make a distinction between
two types of PAYG systems:
a) a pure PAYG system that never holds any fund balances (positive or
negative) but adjusts the contribution rate instantaneously to keep
total contributions and total payouts of retirement beneﬁts in line at
every moment in time,
b) a mixed system in which the pension administration were allowed to
borrow and save on the capital market to smooth short-run ﬂuctuations
of the contribution rate.
In case b), additional contributions and forgone beneﬁts of a person who
postponed retirement by one period could be accumulated by the fund and
used to pay out the additional claims accruing to that individual over the
course of his retirement period. But then it is again the interest rate on the
capital market, r, which is the appropriate rate of return. Clearly, it is ques-
tionable if such a system can be called PAYG and the procedure described
5here requires that "additional" revenues due to changes in retirement age
be distinguished from "ordinary" revenues. On the other hand, it can be
argued that this case is relevant for the German situation in which almost
30 per cent of all pension outlays are ﬁnanced by subsidies from the federal
budget. Provided that ﬂuctuations in net revenues do not lead to changes
in the contribution rate but rather adjustments of the state subsidies and
indirectly of government debt, the opportunity cost of paying one Euro in
period t is in fact paying (1 + r) Euro in period t + 1.
In contrast, in a pure PAYG system of type a), a shift of the retirement
age of a particular individual i from period t to t+1, holding everything else
constant, translates into a cut in the contribution rate in t but an increase
in this rate in the s periods until the death of this individual. Thus it is
impossible to leave all other participants in the system unaﬀected because it
makes all contributors (workers) in period t better oﬀ and all workers in the
periods up to t + s worse oﬀ, so it aﬀects participants diﬀerently according
to their birth year.
Instead of the impossible target of sheltering everybody else from any
consequences of individual i’s behavior, a more modest target could be
achieved, viz.keeping the contribution rate and the implicit taxes due to
participating in the PAYG system from rising in a new steady state when all
workers staring with a particular cohort increase their retirement age by one
year. This question has been analyzed by Breyer and Kifmann (2002), and
the answer is that the rate of return must not exceed the growth rate g to
keep the long-run contribution rate and implicit tax rate constant. Of course,
a number of cohorts in the transition period beneﬁt from lower contribution
and implicit tax rates.
3 Heterogeneous Workers: Concepts of Welfare Max-
imization
With inequality in initial endowments of productivity, health or life ex-
pectancy, eﬃciency is not the only objective in designing a pension system,
and equity considerations come into play. The usual procedure chosen in the
optimal taxation literature is to ﬁrst propose an (Utilitarian) social welfare
function and to derive a ﬁrst-best allocation, and in a second step to make re-
alistic assumptions on the observability of distinguishing characteristics and
6derive a second-best solution and propose a system of incentives which are
suitable to bring about the second-best allocation in the presence of these
informational constraints.
3.1 Heterogeneity in Productivity and Health
Cremer, Lozachmeur, and Pestieau (2004) 1 consider a world in which work-
ers diﬀer in two unobservable characteristics, productivity and health, whereas
life expectancy is still the same for everybody. Health status is here distin-
guished by the rate at which disutility from working increases over the life
cycle, with faster growth indicating worse health. In a ﬁrst-best solution,
consumption is the same for all types, but sick people are allowed to retire
earlier than healthy ones, and the diﬀerences in income are equalized using
person-speciﬁc lump-sum transfers.
With asymmetric information, when productivity and health are posi-
tively correlated but unobservable and period income and retirement age are
observable, the desired redistribution from the high-productivity and the
healthy to the low-productivity and ill types can be accomplished by posi-
tive marginal taxes both on period income and on the length of the working
life (ibid., p.2272). By taxing longer stays in the job (i.e.subsidizing early
retirement), the ill type can be induced to retire earlier whereas the healthy
type, who would lose more income from retiring early, can be discouraged
from mimicking the ill type and thus, by using this additional incentive,
the self-selection constraint can be relaxed, which means that the tax rate
on period income can be lowered. Interestingly, the same result obtains if
individuals diﬀer in either productivity or health but not both.
According to this result, generous early retirement provisions can be in-
terpreted as some kind of disability insurance in a world in which health
and thus disability can not be (perfectly) monitored. The result is the more
remarkable as it is not based on any diﬀerences in life expectancy in the
population.
3.2 Heterogeneity in Life Expectancy
Another potential source of inequality is life expectancy. This is particularly
relevant in the context of social security systems because total retirement
1For a similar model see Sheshinski [2003].
7beneﬁts depend as much on per-period beneﬁts as they do on the length of
the retirement period, a fact that is often overlooked in the design of these
systems.
This point is taken up by Bommier et al.(2005) who assume that length of
life is certain but varies across individuals. The authors consider a benevolent
social planner who maximizes a utilitarian welfare function which is concave
in individual utilities, which can be justiﬁed either with inequality aversion
or with risk aversion with respect to length of life. If length of life were public
knowledge, (ﬁrst-best) welfare maximization would entail that the long-lived
retire later and consume less per period than the short-lived.
When length of life is private knowledge, a typical optimal taxation sit-
uation occurs in which the social planner can only achieve a second-best
optimal allocation in which various pairs of consumption and retirement age
are oﬀered in such a way that the long-lived do not beneﬁt from mimick-
ing the short-lived. The screening instrument proposed by the authors is
a (positive or negative) "retirement bonus" B(z) which depends upon re-
tirement age z and is added to an individual’s gross earnings. The central
result of the paper (ibid., p.14) states that when disutility from work is lin-
ear in the length of the working-life, then B′(z) < 0, i.e. the retirement
bonus is falling in retirement age, which means that there is an implicit tax
on working more years. The intuition behind the result is that the desired
redistribution from the long-lived to the short-lived can be accomplished by
taxing continued activity because the long lived have a stronger demand for
retirement consumption and therefore more incentives to work longer.
4 Fairness when Income and Life Expectancy are
correlated
The concepts of pure eﬃciency discussed in Section 2 are not appropriate in
a world of heterogeneous individuals. On the other hand, the welfare criteria
used in the approaches described in Section 3 are based on highly controver-
sial normative foundations. First, individual utilities must be assumed to be
measurable on a cardinal scale and interpersonally comparable. Secondly, a
speciﬁc functional form of the social welfare function must be given. Finally,
speciﬁc policy implications can only be derived if the functional form of the
individual utility functions is given as well. Thus while these approaches are
8useful in uncovering the relationship between certain widely held value judg-
ments concerning equity and the general design of social security systems,
more speciﬁc implications on the size of adjustment rates for early retirement
can not be expected from these exercises.
Therefore, in the following we shall propose a more modest concept of
"fairness" of social security systems, which is consistent with the usual con-
cept of fairness as distributive neutrality and has the advantage of giving
rise to speciﬁc propositions on the "fair" size of early retirement discounts.
4.1 The Concept of Distributive Neutrality
The principle of "Teilhabe-Äquivalenz" underlying the design of the German
social security system is based on the general notion of distributive neutral-
ity: within a cohort, the expected retirement beneﬁts shall be proportional
to total contributions paid over the working life. The speciﬁc way in which
this principle is implemented, however, consists in making per period retire-
ment beneﬁts proportional to total contributions, disregarding the length of
the beneﬁt spell. This is innocuous as long as there is no systematic vari-
ation in life expectancy across social groups. However, it becomes highly
questionable when life expectancy is positively correlated with income, ed-
ucation and other indicators of social status (Breyer [1997]), and there is
ample evidence from many countries that this correlation indeed exists (for
Germany, see, e.g., Reil-Held [2000], von Gaudecker and Scholz [2006]).
Given these observations, we postulate the following "fairness" criterion:
Deﬁnition: "Distributive neutrality" is satisﬁed in a social security sys-
tem if the ratio between total beneﬁts and total contributions does not vary
systematically with average annual earnings.
This criterion is modest insofar as it does not advocate a speciﬁc eq-
uity norm, but only reformulates the principle of "Teilhabe-Äquivalenz" in
such a way as to leave room for taking certain well-established empirical
relationships into account.
94.2 Implications for Early-Retirement Discounts in the Ger-
man Pension System: Theory
In applying the neutrality concept proposed above to the speciﬁc situation
of the German pension system, the existence of certain regularities has to be
taken as given. In particular, it is assumed that there is an exogenous (and
monotonous) relationship linking life expectancy L to "ability" a, which is
a proxy for socio-economic status. Furthermore, individuals possess private
information on their life expectancy (see, Hurd and McGarry [1995]), which
they take into account in their retirement decisions. Given the early retire-
ment provisions of the pension system which prevail at the time of their
retirement, Wolfe [1983] and Hurd, Smith, and Zissimopoulos [2002] ﬁnd
that the lower an individual’s life expectancy, the more attractive is early
retirement. This implies another monotonous relationship which links re-
tirement age E to ability a. The "true" relationships E(a) and L(a) will
be inferred from empirical estimates based on data from the German social
security system (see Section 4.3, below) and the duration of the beneﬁt spell,
D, is deﬁned as the diﬀerence between life expectancy and retirement age,
D(a) = L(a) − E(a).
Let E0 be the age at which a worker becomes eligible to early retirement
without taking any health related contingencies into account. After this
date, potential future contributions and beneﬁts are discounted with the
real interest rate ρ. At age E0, his accumulated lifetime income is denoted
Y0. According to the beneﬁt formula valid in this system, annual beneﬁts B
are proportional to total (taxable) lifetime income, Y , and are subject to a
discount rate x for every year of retiring earlier than at age 65. Therefore,
if they are discounted to age E0, they are given by




On the other hand, total contributions C are proportional to lifetime income
and consist of two parts: those contributions which were paid before age
E0 and which are proportional to total income up to this age, Y0, and the









where c denotes the contribution rate. We do not discount previous contri-
butions for two reasons. First, this is consistent with German pension law,
which treats all contributions equally, no matter when they were paid; and
secondly we can not observe the time-path of contributions but only the sum
so we could not implement discounting in our data set.














Now, if we know the functions E(a), L(a), Y (a), and Y0(a), we can
write the beneﬁt-contribution ratio r as a function of ability a, given the
discount rate x. Distributive neutrality is then satisﬁed if there is no sys-
tematic (monotonous) relationship between the beneﬁt-contribution ratio r
and ability a, while the system is redistributive in a regressive (progressive)
way if r is an increasing (decreasing) function of a.
4.3 Empirical Estimation
The variables used in this analysis are taken from a data set on pension dis-
continuations from 1993 to 2003, FDZ-RV (2005), published by the Federa-
tion of German Pension Insurance Institutes (VDR, now: Deutsche Renten-
versicherung Bund). It contains a 10% sample of all discontinued public
pensions due to the death of the beneﬁciary, which amounts to roughly one
million observations. However, each observation corresponds to a pension,
and not to an individual retiree, who can (subsequently or even simultane-
ously) beneﬁt from more than one pension. Taking this into account, we
are left with a sample of 98,399 pensioners whose beneﬁts are based on own
contributions. The most important variables are the sum of pension beneﬁt
claims (in points), the length of the work life, the retirement age, and the
11age at death. From the ﬁrst two variables we construct the average claims
earned per year of work. One point corresponds to contributions based on
one year of the average annual income. Other variables which are contained
in the data set have to be taken with care – they are only reliable when
they have been used for the calculation of beneﬁts, otherwise they are either
unreliable or missing. See table 1 for descriptive statistics of the variables
used.
Weighting Function Our sample suﬀers from a selection bias. Since we
observe a death cohort (though a rather large one), life expectancies are
biased downwards. In each death cohort, a large variety of birth cohorts
are included, and we know that life expectancy has been increasing with the
year of birth. However, this increase is only partially taken into account
in the sample, as especially individuals from younger birth cohorts (whose
ex ante life expectancy should be higher) only appear in the sample if they
died relatively young. Ideally, we would like to observe a birth cohort of
which all individuals have already died; obviously, this is only possible for
very old birth cohorts (born around 1900) in order to get unbiased estimates.
However, as life expectancy has been increasing over time, these very early
birth cohorts may not be representative for more recent cohorts and therefore
not suitable for drawing policy conclusions.
Our approach to correcting this selection bias is relatively simple. The
selection that occurs is not based on individual decision making – it is solely
a matter of data selection. Among the later birth cohorts, deaths at young
age are over-represented. The relationship is empirically linear (which cor-
responds to the usually perceived increase of life expectancies), so a linear
weighting function, which decreases with the birth year, potentially corrects
this bias. However, ex ante we cannot be sure about the slope of weighting
function; we only know that it has to be linear and non-negative over the
whole support. The parameter of choice is therefore only the slope, while
the intercept serves as a normalizing constant that limits the range of the
potential slopes in order to ensure the non-negativity constraint. If GBJ
denotes the year of birth (normalized to zero for the earliest birth cohort),
the weighting function w takes the following form, with s being the slope
parameter:
12w(GBJ) = 1 − s · GBJ (4)
With the intercept set to one, s can vary between zero (hence, a weight of
one for all birth cohorts) and 0.0128, which just ensures that the weight for
the latest birth cohort is still positive. The selection criterion for our choice
of the slope parameter remains to be determined. We select the weighting
function which minimizes the diﬀerence between the weighted average life
expectancy in our data and the exogenously known life expectancy. Yet,
the maximum average age at death obtained with this method (i.e. the one
which results from the steepest weighting function) is still lower than the
value of life expectancy observed in population statistics.2
Descriptive Statistics
all obs. restr. restr., weights
mean st.dev. mean st.dev. mean st.dev.
retirement age E 58.47 7.37 58.04 5.54 58.48 5.56
age at death L 65.85 7.84 65.32 6.31 66.16 6.14
total points Y 31.14 17.42 42.71 13.00 42.69 13.21
— till E0 = 60, Y0 36.19 22.34 47.59 15.20 44.82 14.82
points per year a 1.06 0.42 1.12 0.30 1.11 0.31
sex = female 32.63% — 0% — 0% —
Based on FDZ-RV (2005). With all observations, n = 98,399 Restricted to male observations
with at least 25 years of contributions, n = 51,075.
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Estimation In principle, more than one deﬁnition of retirement and there-
fore of the beneﬁt spell can be distinguished. Our variable retirement age
E is the age of the ﬁrst receipt of any pension based on own contributions,
which can be the old-age pension, but also disability pensions. This no-
tion is in line with our theoretical approach because it takes all paths into
2Notice however that the concept of life expectancy in a given year always refers to
age-speciﬁc death rates of this year and not to the average age at death of the death cohort
of this very year.
13retirement including disability pensions into account. Insofar as claiming
disability beneﬁts carries some information on the innate ability (including
the health capital) of the individual, this is certainly the superior concept
compared to the alternative of taking the ﬁrst receipt of an old-age pension
as the age of retirement.
Furthermore, the following procedures were performed with the data.
First, observations on women were excluded. Since ability (or the earnings
capacity) cannot be observed directly, it has to be ensured that the average
beneﬁt claims are a good proxy. In the simplest case, namely when an
individual has worked during his whole career and contributed to the public
pension system, beneﬁt claims are a linear transformation of income.3 This
even holds if the individual under observations had longer times of education
before starting to work or if he or she raised children. The measure is then
only slightly diluted, as claims are increased by these activities in order
to compensate for the loss of regular contributions. The close relationship
between total income and beneﬁt claims, however, is not guaranteed once
the individual has been self-employed or has worked as a civil servant for
some time in his career. During these times, usually no contributions are
paid, as membership in the public pension system is not mandatory (or even
possible) anymore. We therefore restrict our sample to those pensioners who
worked at least 25 years in a job where contributions are mandatory. This
sample contains 51,075 observations. Our results diﬀer compared to the ones
using the whole sample, but are robust with respect to the exact choice of
the number of years required.
In this data set we do not observe the value of Y0, which we can construct
by
Y0 = Y − a(E − E0). (5)
To estimate the relationships E(a), L(a), Y (a), and Y0(a), we assume
quadratic functional forms for the ﬁrst two in order to account for potential
non-linearities. The income variables Y and Y0 are by deﬁnition linear in
average annual earnings a.
3Up to a certain income, beyond which contributions (and therefore claims) are capped.
The maximum contributions are based (in 2006) on a monthly gross income of EUR 5250
and are adjusted on a yearly basis.
14E = ǫ0 + ǫ1a + ǫ2a2 +  1 (6)
L = λ0 + λ1a + λ2a2 +  2 (7)
Y = κ0 + κ1a +  3 (8)
Y0 = γ0 + γ1a +  4. (9)
The regression results are given in table 2. In the baseline regressions, we
do not include further control variables, as the question of causality of a for E
and L is irrelevant for our argument of distributional neutrality.4 Though all
a and a2 coeﬃcients are signiﬁcant at least on the .99 signiﬁcance level, the
predictive power of a for retirement age and of life expectancy is comparably
low. The respective R2 does not exceed .0.071, in one regression it is even
as low as .024.
Estimation Results
Dep. Var. const. a a2 R2
E 65.85 –9.21 2.16 0.071
(0.20) (0.37) (0.18)
L 72.29 –9.33 3.20 0.026
(0.26) (0.50) (0.26)
Y 1.89 36.66 — 0.730
(0.13) (0.13)
Y0 –1.93 42.02 — 0.762
(0.19) (0.18)
Data set includes only male observations with at least 25 years of own contributions. All a and
a2 coeﬃcients are signiﬁcant at least on the .99 level (robust standard errors in parenthesis).
Table 2: Estimation Results
4In a sensitivity analysis we augmented the regressions with two control variables,
namely the number of months the person had spent in unemployment during his career and
the number of months he spent in ill-health – as far as the spell of ill-health was relevant
for the calculation of beneﬁt claims. This yields only marginally diﬀerent results, with
ﬁgures not diﬀerent in shape, but only hardly shifted downwards. However, signiﬁcance
of the coeﬃcients of the controls does not fall below the .95 level. Including a time trend
to capture the eﬀect of the sequential introduction of discounts for early retirement in the
retirement age regression has only a minor impact on the results.
15We restrict a to lie in the interval (0,3). The boundedness of a results
from the inspection of our data, meaning that the highest income per year
is restricted to be not greater than three times the average. We cannot
unambiguously distinguish between claims earned because of own work or
because of times of education, parenting, and other (minor) reasons. The
maximum of a (especially in the cases without restrictions on the minimum
number of years of contribution) is therefore higher than what could have
been achieved by contributions based on work only, in which case we had
amax = 2.15.
4.4 Results and Interpretation
Using the regression results described in table 2, we can ﬁrst calculate the
return function r(a) based on the presently valid discount rate x = .036,
which is depicted in ﬁgure 2. We observe that for all values of a larger than
about 0.7, the return ratio is an increasing function of our ability variable,
which conﬁrms the conjecture that the present pension regulations system-
atically redistribute income from the less able to the more able individuals,
mainly due to diﬀerences in life expectancy.







Axes drawn at a = 1 and rc/b(1), ρ = 0.03
Figure 2: Ratio of Beneﬁts and Contributions
Figure 3 shows simulated returns for diﬀerent discount rates, varying
16from 0 to 10 per cent per year, given our functional form. We observe
that these functions are still increasing over a wide range of values of a
and the slope is the larger the smaller the early-retirement discount rate.
This counter intuitive result – to achieve at least approximate distributive
neutrality, the early-retirement discounts have to be raised – is certainly a
consequence of the decreasing E(a) function, i.e.of the fact that – at least
in our data – men with high annual income not only lived longer but they
also retired earlier than men with lower income.















Left from top to bottom: x = 0, x = 0.02, x = 0.03, and x = 0.05. Right from top to bottom:
x = 0.07, x = 0.08, x = 0.09, and x = 0.10.
Figure 3: Ratio of Beneﬁts and Contributions
4.5 Direct Estimation of the Ratio-Ability-Relationship
A further possibility to estimate the relationship between the ratio of ben-
eﬁts to contributions and ability is to construct the variable r as deﬁned in
equation (3) and explain the ratio r by ability a directly:
r = ρ0 + ρ1a + ρ2a2 +   (10)
See ﬁgure 4 for a variety of results, given discounts ranging from x = 0.00
to x = 0.10, the values also used in ﬁgure 3. Similar to the estimation
procedure proposed above, the slope of the ﬁtted function r(a) is smaller
the higher the early retirement discount is. However, the functional form of
the ﬁtted r function looks somewhat diﬀerent when the direct estimation is
used—namely either monotonously increasing or decreasing—whereas when
r is constructed using the basic relationships L(a), E(a), Y (a), and Y0(a),
17the function r includes higher polynomials of a, and therefore has a non-
monotone shape.
0 1 2 3
ability
Benefit-Contribution-Ratios
Solid: x = 0.036. Ordered from top to bottom with x = 0.00 at the top and x = 0.10 at the
bottom.
Figure 4: Direct Estimation of the Beneﬁt-Contribution-Ratio as
a Function of Ability
4.6 Achieving Distributional Neutrality
If we want to apply our criterion of distributional neutrality to the diﬀerent
r(a|x) functions, given that x is a constant, the return functions have to
be linearized. We then compare the linear return functions rlin(a|x) with
respect to their slope parameter and choose the discounts x that minimize
the absolute value of this slope. As the method of linearization we choose
least squares, because it inherently takes the distribution of ability a into
account. By this method, we ﬁt straight lines to the return functions based
on 1000 diﬀerent discount rates on the interval (0,0.10). The discount rate
that minimizes the slope of rlin turns out to be 0.0591. See ﬁgure 5, where
the relationship between discounts x and the slope parameter is depicted in
the left panel. In the right panel, the (unrestricted) return function r(a|x =
0.0591) is compared to the resulting linearized form. The search for the
neutralizing discounts as well as ﬁgure 5 are based on ability a to lie between
0.3 and 2.15, which is the theoretical maximum of beneﬁt claims earned per
one year of work.
18Left: Slope-Parameter, given the Discount Rate x, Right: Beneﬁt-Contribution Ratio and
Linearized Form, given x = 0.0591.
Figure 5: Linearization
Hence, we ﬁnd that the current discounts of x = 0.036 are too low to
achieve distributional neutrality. The main reason for this result is the nega-
tive relationship between ability and retirement age. However, this might be
a consequence of the data set we use. The individuals under observation died
between 1993 and 2003. With an average beneﬁt duration of approximately
8 years, many retired between 1985 and 1995, a period in which the federal
government allowed the rather excessive use of early retirement schemes.
Additionally, these early retirement schemes were oﬀered mainly by large
companies, which are known to pay higher wages for the same level of quali-
ﬁcation. So our measure a does not only capture ability, but also diﬀerences
in ﬁrm size, economic sector etc., and along these dimensions possibilities
to retire early diﬀered for (otherwise equal) individual workers. We there-
fore propose to see our results as an exemplary application of a method to
achieve distributional neutrality within the public pension system, whereas
actual policy advice should be based on more recent data, which allows to
infer on the behavior of future retirees.
A further reﬁnement of our results would need a theoretical model that
explains retirement behavior not only depending on ability, but also on dis-
counts for early retirement x. Until now, our estimated functions E(a) are
based on the discounts which were in place at that time. Although we princi-
pally observe a policy change (namely, the introduction of ﬂexible retirement
along with the phasing-in of actuarial discounts in 1992), this legislation did
not introduce actuarial discounts alone. The reaction on a variation in x is
19therefore hard to disentangle from simultaneous amendments of the German
social security code.
5 Concluding Remarks
In this paper we discussed several notions of "fairness" of early retirement
provisions in pay-as-you-go ﬁnanced public pension systems. We advanced
the thesis that the "right" notion of fairness depends upon the objectives
pursued in the design of pension systems, which can range from the pure
eﬃciency goal of achieving a "distortion-free" retirement decision to the very
ambitious equity goal implicit in maximizing a social welfare function in the
tradition of optimal taxation theory. We pointed out the problems attached
to both of these "extreme" positions and proposed a more modest concept
of equity, called "distributive neutrality", which is based on the notion that
the rate of return on total contributions to the pension system should not
depend systematically on the individual’s ability.
By applying this concept to the German retirement beneﬁt formula and
taking empirically estimated relationships between average annual income
(as a proxy for ability), life expectancy and retirement age into account, we
were able to calculate the relationship between average annual income and
the beneﬁt-contribution ratio which is increasing over a wide range of para-
meter values. Thus distributive neutrality is presently violated but instead
there is systematic redistribution in favor of high-ability persons. As this
group is not only enjoying higher life expectancy but – at least according
to our data – also retires earlier, lowering early-retirement discounts, as e.g.
proposed by Sheshinski (2003), would in this case exacerbate this redistrib-
ution.
It should be emphasized that our empirical approach is based on the
unrealistic assumption that the choice of retirement age is not already af-
fected by the existing early-retirement discounts. If this were indeed the
case, as could be expected, we would have to replace the E(a) function by
a relationship of the form E(a;x). The present data set does not allow to
estimate such a function as the discounts were phased-in gradually and thus
a corresponding variable would be perfectly correlated with a time trend.
Moreover, diﬀerent groups of persons were subject to diﬀerent values of x,
but we did not have this information.
20Finally, an alternative (and equivalent) approach to achieving distribu-
tive neutrality would consist in estimating only the L(a) function which maps
annual income into life expectancy and then inferring the expected length of
the beneﬁt spell by subtracting the retirement age chosen by the individual
from his or her estimated life expectancy. Annual retirement beneﬁts can
then be calculated so that total discounted expected retirement beneﬁts are
a given (and equal) percentage of total lifetime contributions. The result-
ing beneﬁt formula would be a variant of the "notional deﬁned contribution"
system, adjusted for income-group speciﬁc diﬀerences of life expectancy. De-
riving the respective beneﬁt formula will be the topic of future research.
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